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In recent years, the application of computational modeling in studies on age-related changes in 
decision making and learning has gained in popularity. One advantage of computational models 
is that they provide access to latent variables that cannot be directly observed from behavior. 
In combination with experimental manipulations, these latent variables can help to test 
hypotheses about age-related changes in behavioral and neurobiological measures at a level of 
specificity that is not achievable with descriptive analysis approaches alone. This level of 
specificity can in turn be beneficial to establish the identity of the corresponding behavioral and 
neurobiological mechanisms. In this paper, we will illustrate applications of computational 
methods using examples of lifespan research on risk taking, strategy selection and 
reinforcement learning. We will elaborate on problems that can occur when computational 
neuroscience methods are applied to data of different age groups. Finally, we will discuss 
potential targets for future applications and outline general shortcomings of computational 
neuroscience methods for research on human lifespan development. 
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Over the past two decades there has been a significant increase in the number of 
cognitive neuroscience studies of lifespan development (Amso & Scerif, 2015; Li & 
Rieckmann, 2014; Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 2015). However, despite this inflation in 
empirical studies, there has been a serious lag in the development of comprehensive theories 
linking brain development and behavior (Pfeifer & Allen, 2012, 2016; van den Bos & Eppinger, 
2016). The current conundrum of developmental neuroscience consists of two major 
explanatory problems. First, there is a specificity problem: The current verbal theories of 
neurocognitive development are not specific enough to be translated into precise behavioral 
and neuroscience predictions. As a result, it is often impossible to tell whether new 
neuroscientific data confirm or falsify existing theories (van den Bos & Eppinger, 2016). 
Related to this issue is the identity problem: We are often unable to precisely identify the 
processes that underlie developmental differences in behavior.  
 
Figure 1. A) Marr’s levels of analysis. B) Cartoon of a child choosing between two wheels of fortune. A risky option 
with a 75% chance of winning 20 Euro and 25% chance of losing 4 Euro versus a safe option with 100% chance of 
winning 14 Euro. Choosing the option with the highest outcome variance (the risky option) is often considered risk 
seeking behavior in the context of these tasks (even when total expected value is the same).  
David Marr’s levels of analysis approach (Figure 1A) is probably the best-known framework 
devised to formalize our understanding of brain-behavior relationships (Marr & Poggio, 1976). 
In this approach, the first level is more abstract and is concerned with the “Why” question of 
behavior (e.g., why would it be beneficial for adolescents take more risks?). The “Why” 
question may inspire experimental design that can help understand when a particular behavior 
occurs. For instance, if risk taking is a form of costly signaling, showing off your strength to 
gain social status in the group, it should occur specifically in presence of relevant peers. 
Computational analyses of behavior would target Marr’s algorithmic level (the “What” 
question). The algorithmic level focuses on the rules that underlie behavior (e.g., risk preference 
can be formalized as calculating expected utility (EU) or minimax choice rules, see below for 
more detail). Finally, the third level (“How” question) refers to the implementation of the 
algorithm. What is the neurobiological substrate that supports this behavior? Marr famously 
argued that it is impossible to bridge the gap from the implementational level (neural processes) 
to behavior (risk seeking) without referring to the algorithmic level, because neural processes 
per se do not tell us anything about the algorithm they implement (see also (Krakauer, 
Ghazanfar, Gomez-Marin, Maciver, & Poeppel, 2017)). 
Following this line of argument, we argue that computational modeling can foster the 
understanding of lifespan development by providing testable theories that provide a bridge 
between Marr’s levels of analyses. One key advantage of computational models is that they 
allow us to capture latent variables that cannot be directly observed from behavior. As a result, 
by using computational models, we are better able to build specific theories about lifespan 
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development and to identify processes that underlie developmental changes in behavior. In 
comparison to purely descriptive theories, the use of computational models can lead to 
substantially different predictions about behavior and explanations about the underlying 
processes. We will illustrate our arguments with specific examples in the context of decisions 
from descriptions (risk-taking and strategy selection) and reinforcement learning. We will also 
discuss several problems and potential solutions that arise when applying computational 
modeling to data of different age groups. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the 
prospects of neuro-computational approaches in terms of our understanding of developmental 
changes across the human lifespan. 
 
Models of Judgment and Decision-Making 
 
There has been a considerable increase in the use of paradigms from behavioral economics to 
study developmental changes underlying judgment and decision making. For instance, several 
developmental fMRI studies used risky decision making paradigms in which participants have 
to make repeated choices between safe and risky monetary gambles (for review see  (Crone, 
van Duijvenvoorde, & Peper, 2016)). In most cases the aim of these studies was to investigate 
the developmental trajectories of risky decision making with the prediction that increased risk 
taking in teenagers results from an imbalance in the neural systems of motivation and cognitive 
control. In almost all of these studies, the analytic approach relied on objective measures of 
risk, e.g. comparing high versus low probability gambles or options of different expected value 
(EV: probability (p) multiplied by outcome (x)). However, since the development of prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) we know that the subjective evaluation of outcomes in 
most cases does not match the (objective) expected value of choice options. Furthermore, it is 
very likely that the subjective judgment of outcomes and probabilities differ between age 
groups (Eppinger, Mock, & Kray, 2009; Harbaugh, Krause, & Vesterlund, 2002; Paulsen, Platt, 
Huettel, & Brannon, 2011; van den Bos, Cohen, Kahnt, & Crone, 2012). 
One way of addressing these issues is to refer to expected utility (EU) models, such as 
cumulative prospect theory (CPT; (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992)), that explicitly account for 
the fact that people do not behave as EV models would predict. One key notion of EU models 
is that of decreasing marginal sensitivity. That is, outcomes have decreasing marginal effects 
as more is gained or lost (see Box 1). For instance, this implies that receiving 10 Euro when 
you have nothing is subjectively experienced as a bigger gain than receiving 10 Euro when you 
already have 10.000 Euro on your bank account. This principle is very similar to the notion in 
psychophysics that the objective intensity of a stimulus is distinct from the subjective intensity 
that guides behavior (G. Fechner, 1966). According to most EU models the transformation of 
an outcome into its utility (U) is described by a power function 
 
(1)     ܷ(ݔ) = ݔఈ  
 
where in a monetary gamble x denotes the objective amount of money, and where 0 <  < 1  
denotes the degree that utility is diminished when the amounts of money increase. Thus, U(x) 
is a concave value function that describes the degree of risk-averse behavior. Note that because 
the function is concave, the subjective utility of gaining 20 Euro is only around 10 on the 
subjective utility scale. As a result, a risky prospect of gaining 20 Euro (at 10% chance) is not 
so attractive compared to a sure 2 Euro, even if objective EV is equal. CPT extends the more 
primitive EU value functions by adding three additional assumptions; (1) that there is a 
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distinction between sensitivity for gains and losses, (2) that gains and losses are defined relative 
to a reference point, and (3) that there is asymmetry in the steepness of the value functions for 




Box 1. Cumulative Prospect Theory 
 
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) suggest the following value function: 
 
ܷ(ݔ) = ൜ݔ௔ ,														ݔ	 ≥ 0
−ߣ(−ݔ)ఉ , ݔ < 0	 
 
where in a monetary gamble x denotes the objective amount of money, and where 0 <  < 1  
denotes the degree that utility is diminished when positive amounts of money increase, and 
where 0 <  < 1  denotes the degree that utility is diminished when the amounts of monetary 
losses increase. In addition, the ߣ parameter captures the psychological difference between 
losses and gains (losses tend to loom larger than gains).  
 
Besides a subjective value function, CPT also assumes a psychological transformation of 
objective probabilities, p, into subjective probabilities, π (p). For simple gambles with just 
two possible outcomes subjective probabilities are expressed as: 
 
ߨ(݌) = ݌ఊ
݌ఊ − (1 − ݌ఊ)ଵ/ఊ 
where the parameter γ indicates the strength of the transformation of probabilities. The typical 
shape of the weighting function suggests that people overestimate small probabilities and 
underestimate high probabilities. Finally, like most other utility models the expected utility 




A) Fit of CPT for a set of choices by hypothetical adolescents and adults. B) Two response probability curves for 
two fictitious groups of adolescents and adults that only differ in their level of choice sensitivity (see eq. 2 in text), 
but have the exact same EU estimations. Note that in this example the mean level of risky choices (as indicated 
with the dashed lines) will be higher for the adolescents than the adults.   
 
  








































In heuristic models of adolescent risk taking it is often assumed that an increased 
proportion of risky choices is the result of increased reward sensitivity. However, in many cases 
this relationship is only loosely defined and therefore it is difficult to make specific predictions 
about choice behavior or neural measures (van den Bos & Eppinger, 2016). In contrast, CPT 
suggests that differences in risk preferences between age groups can be attributed to different 
mechanisms. Let us consider a possible gamble such as the one displayed in Figure 1B: Option 
A is associated with a 75% chance of winning 20 Euro and a 25% chance of losing 4 Euro. In 
contrast, option B represents a guaranteed win of 14 Euro.  
 
The risky option may be more attractive to an adolescent (AD) compared to a young adult (YA) 
because of:  
 
1) adolescents show higher gain sensitivity (AD > YA). That is, 20 Euro are subjectively more 
valuable to the adolescent; one possible interpretation of “reward sensitivity”,  
2) adolescents show decreased loss sensitivity (AD < YA). Thus, losing 4 Euro is subjectively 
less aversive to the adolescent,  
3) reduced loss aversion (AD > YA). That is, the psychological difference between gains and 
losses in adolescents is smaller compared to adults, 
4) a combination of the above.  
 
What this illustrates is that using EU models can help identifying the specific psychological 
mechanisms underlying developmental differences in risky choice (see also (van 
Duijvenvoorde et al., 2015) for a similar approach). As a result, they can also help to better 
understand how contextual modulations, such as peer presence (Albert, Chein, & Steinberg, 
2013), impacts risky choice behavior (e.g., peer presence may specifically alter loss aversion). 
Indeed, several behavioral studies have already identified that there are significant age 
differences in both probability weighting (Harbaugh et al., 2002) and value functions 
(Blankenstein, Crone, van den Bos, & van Duijvenvoorde, 2016; Tymula et al., 2012; van den 
Bos & Hertwig, 2017) between adults and adolescents.  
In most cases utility models are combined with the so-called softmax choice rule that 
assumes that expected utilities of the options under consideration are probabilistically translated 
into choices. For instance, the probability of choosing a risky option, when confronted with a 
safe and risky alternative, would be formalized as follows: 
 




where the single free parameter ߠin this function governs the sensitivity to differences in EU. 
When participants are less sensitive to EU differences, their preferences become less consistent. 
For instance, let us compare the hypothetical choice functions in Box 1. The blue curve for 
adolescents is clearly “flatter” compared to the red curve describing the adults. This flatness 
indicates a decreased sensitivity to differences in EU. Both groups will prefer the option with 
the highest EU but adolescent will be less consistent in their choice behavior. 
As a result, even when two groups may have the same ‘risk aversion’ parameter () 
but different noise parameters (ߠ, like the hypothetical adolescents) it is possible that one group 
will show a higher proportion of risky choices. This is strongly dependent on the choice set 
given to the participants. In Box 1, we have indicated a hypothetical choice set of gambles for 
which EUsafe - EUrisk= [-20, 10]. The shaded areas indicate the proportion of risky choices for 
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each group, given that choice set, the dotted lines indicate mean levels of risk taking. If we 
would just compare mean levels of risk taking in this hypothetical experiment, we would 
conclude that adolescents are more risk-seeking than young adults. Yet, in fact, their behavioral 
differences are due a diminished sensitivity to outcome differences. Importantly, note that with 
a different choice set, where EUsafe - EUrisk= [-10, 20], the adolescents will still be closer to 50% 
risky choices but then will appear as more risk averse. Thus, this suggests that relying solely 
on choice proportions, or even just on EV models of risky choice can lead to substantial 
misinterpretations of age differences in risky decision making. Computational approaches using 
EU models can help to avoid these misconceptions, and can be used to identify the specific 








A) & B) Based on subjective utility differences the same choice set may result in mostly risky choices for 
adolescents and mostly safe choices for adults. Studies have shown that choices that are close to the indifference 
point (the point at which each option is equally preferred) are associated with increased reaction times (Krajbich, 
Bartling, Hare, & Fehr, 2015), which is thought to reflect increased choice conflict (Botvinick, 2007). As a result, 
the most infrequent choices for each age group are associated with increased levels of choice conflict. C) In this 
example one may predict that adolescents show more BOLD activation in conflict monitoring regions (e.g., dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex) when choosing the safe option compared to adults. This can falsely be interpreted that in 
general adolescents need more “control” to avoid risk, although it is a specific effect due to the choice set that is 
used. This illustrates the usefulness of thinking about our choice experiments in terms of EU. A second implication 
is that what on an objective level seems like the same set of questions may be very different on the subjective 
level. This could result in rather imbalanced choice patterns introduce various unexpected and undesirable 
confounds in the experimental design and the post-hoc exclusion of subjects (e.g., those who chose the safe option 
over 90% of the time). A simple solution is to let participants perform a pre-test to estimate parameters of the 
utility model, and subsequently generate unique choice sets for each individual that are equally distributed around 
the EU indifference point (e.g., van den Bos et al., 2015).  
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Implications for imaging 
The notion of EU has far reaching implications for neuroimaging studies. There is ample 
evidence that there are brain regions, like the ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, that track EU in choice experiments (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Peters & Büchel, 2010). 
As we have pointed out above, EU may differ significantly from EV. Thus, if researchers use 
EV instead of EU as a parametric regressor in their imaging analyses of risky gambles, this will 
result in a better fit for those subjects for which EV and EU are most closely related (e.g., an  
close to 1). Using EV will therefore be potentially misleading if age groups differ in how close 
their EV function is to the EU function.  
 For example, let’s assume that the utility curve in adolescents more closely resembles 
the EV of the presented decision options and, let’s assume that activity in the ventral striatum 
tracks the EU (rather than the EV) of options. In an analysis that only considers the EV of 
options the result might be greater EV-related activity in the ventral striatum in teenagers 
compared to adults and the conclusion would that adolescents show greater reward-sensitivity 
during risky decision-making. However, if we would run the same analysis with EU instead of 
EV we might find a very different result. Namely that there are no age differences in EU-related 
activity in the ventral striatum.  
 
Of course, there are more complex risk tasks in which the probabilities and outcomes 
have to be learned by experience, such as the Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART) or the Iowa 
gambling task (IGT). It is possible that these paradigms have more predictive validity in terms 
of real world risk taking (Schonberg et al., 2012; van den Bos & Hertwig, 2017). However, 
these tasks partly depend on learning from experience and come with additional challenges in 
terms of computational modeling, which will be discussed below. Before turning to those 
issues, we will consider an alternative approach to decisions from description that focuses on 
the different strategies that individuals of different age might engage in when making choices  
 
The Strategy View 
The expected utility models discussed above represent an integrative approach that captures 
individual and developmental differences using specific parameterizations within a single 
model. The strategy view provides an alternative framework in that differences between 
individuals or across development are conceptualized as the use of fundamentally different 
strategies. Strategies can be thought of as sequences of operations or building blocks that can 
be combined to solve a particular task (Mata, Josef, & Lemaire, 2015). The strategy view has 
been used widely and successfully to understand the lifespan development of memory, 







Figure 2. When presented with a simple binary choice gamble there are different strategies. The hardmax choice 
rule deterministically chooses the option with the higher expected value. Other strategies, such as minimax and 
maximax, only use part of the information that is presented. Maximax tries to maximize to maximum possible gain 
and minimax tries to minimize the maximum possible loss. Although they may yield seemingly similar behavior, 
they rely on different mental processes. Furthermore, even though these strategies may sometimes be captured by a 
parametric model such as cumulative prospect theory parameterizations (Pachur, Suter, & Hertwig, 2017), they 
make different predictions about what happens on algorithmic and neural level (e.g., no representation of expected 
utility, no integration of possible outcomes). 
 
There is a long-standing tradition in decision making research to distinguish between different 
strategies or heuristics (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). Two broad classes of strategies include 
compensatory strategies, that process all relevant information and consider possible trade-offs 
between attributes of decision options, and non-compensatory strategies, that avoid such 
trade-offs and typically reduce information processing demands by ignoring potentially 
relevant information (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). 
One example of a non-compensatory strategy is a lexicographic strategy that simply selects 
the alternative that is best on the most important attribute (e.g. the best possible outcome 
regardless probability, see Figure 2). On the other hand, the previously described CPT is an 
example of a compensatory strategy that uses all possible information to come to a decision.   
Formally, non-compensatory and compensatory strategies can be distinguished by how 
they assign weights to different cues in a decision problem, say deciding between two 
alternatives characterized by two or more cues (e.g., probability and outcome magnitude). 
Consider an ordered set of cues, C1 to CM. A non-compensatory strategy is defined by assigned 
weights to each cue, W = {w1, w2, w3, …, wM}, in a manner that each weight is larger than the 
sum of the subsequent weights. For example, in a five cue example, the set {1, 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 
1/16}, fulfills the requirement that for every cue weight 1 ≤ ݆ ≤ ܯ	we have ௝ܹ > ∑ ௞ܹ௞வ௝ . 
These weights amount to making a decision whenever the first cue distinguishes between the 
two alternatives and ignoring all other remaining cues, because the subsequent weights cannot 
“overrule” the first.  
Importantly, the strategy view typically emphasizes not only the specific cue weighting 
but also the importance of the sequences of processes. Therefore it will typically make 
predictions about other outcomes beyond choice, including search (Scholz, von Helversen, & 
Rieskamp, 2015), reaction times (Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007) or neural processes (von 
Helversen, Karlsson, Rasch, & Rieskamp, 2014), that can further constrain developmental 
theories. These additional predictions can help to identify the underlying choice strategy that 
cannot be distinguished based on choice proportions or patterns alone (see also table 1).   
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The empirical work that has adopted the strategy approach suggests that compensatory 
and non-compensatory strategies may tap into different abilities, including the ability to inhibit 
irrelevant information or integrate many pieces of information that show important individual 
differences and developmental trends across the lifespan (Betsch, Lehmann, Lindow, & Lang, 
2016; Huizenga et al., 2007; Mata, Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2011; Mata, Helversen, & 
Rieskamp, 2010; Mata, Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2007; Pachur, Mata, & Schooler, 2009). For 
example, young children seem to have difficulties using “simple” non-compensatory decision 
strategies due to deficits in cognitive control abilities that develop relatively late during 
childhood and that are necessary to inhibit accessible but irrelevant information (Mata et al., 
2011). All in all, such results emphasize the importance of understanding the various strategies 
available to decision makers as well as the abilities that such strategies exploit which undergo 
substantial change during childhood and aging.  
 
Implications for imaging 
These age differences in learning and decision-strategies are important to take into account 
when analyzing neuroscience data. Knowing that different age groups may apply different 
strategies, and thus rely on different cognitive processes, will be extremely insightful in 
understanding different patterns of neural activity. This point is nicely illustrated by a recent 
fMRI study by van Duijvenvoorde and colleagues (van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2016). In this 
study participants were presented with a set of gambles designed to identify compensatory and 
non-compensatory strategies in risky choice. The results revealed that participants who applied 
a compensatory strategy showed a pattern of activity in the parietal cortex that reflected 
differences in EV between choice options. In contrast, for those who seemed to apply the non-
compensatory strategy, their activation in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex associated with 
greater conflict on the attribute level. If the authors would have used a single model to interpret 
the patterns of activity, it would have most likely led to a misguided interpretation.  
 
The examples discussed above suggest that it may be helpful to distinguish different 
types of strategies when understanding the lifespan development of judgment and decision 
processes. The strategy approach, however, is not without empirical and conceptual challenges. 
For example, empirically, acknowledging heterogeneity in strategy use forces researchers to 
collect appropriately large samples to capture the cognitive and neural processes of each of the 
hypothesized strategy types. Conceptually, researchers face the problem of determining the 
space of hypothesized strategies a priori so as to avoid the problem of dealing with an 
intractable large number of strategies - the strategy sprawl problem (Scheibehenne, Rieskamp, 
& Wagenmakers, 2013). Fortunately, there are several possible approaches to deal with these 
challenges. We present an overview of the main problems, possible solutions, and some 






Problem Possible Solution(s) 
Strategy sprawl: There is a 
potentially large number of 
combination of core processes 
or building blocks that can be 
combined which may lead to 
hypothesizing an intractably 
large number of strategies 
 Use a pre-defined and constrained set of strategies 
that have been validated in past research (Mata, 
Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2007) 
 Validate the use of several strategies using 
additional process data, such as search (Scholz et al., 
2015), reaction time (Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007), 
or neural data (H. B. Fechner et al., 2016; Khader et 
al., 2011)  (Fechner et al., 2016; Helversen et al., 
2014; Khader, Pachur, Meier, Bien, & Jost, 2011) 
 Adopt Bayesian modeling to help quantify the trade-
off between flexibility in the number of 
hypothesized strategies and descriptive adequacy 
(Scheibehenne et al., 2013)  
 Explicitly model the mixture of strategies, and use 
parameter estimation to establish the contributions 
of individual strategies (Bays, Catalao, & Husain, 
2009; Collins & Frank, 2012; van den Berg, Awh, & 
Ma, 2014).   
Identification problem: 
Different strategies may often 
provide the same judgment or 
choice 
 Design experimental paradigms so as to include 
critical tests that allow maximizing differences 
between hypothesized strategies (Mata et al., 2007; 
Mata, von Helversen, Karlsson, & Cüpper, 2012; 
von Helversen, Mata, & Olsson, 2010)  
Individual heterogeneity: 
Heterogeneity in strategy 
selection across individuals 
may lead to few individuals 
using the same strategy in a 
given situation 
 Calculate power a priori based on hypothesized 
strategies and collect appropriately large samples 
 Collapse across individuals in a meaningful way, for 
example, across similar strategy types, such as 
compensatory and non-compensatory strategies 
(Mata, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2010) or rule-
based  and similarity-based processes  
 Design the task to elicit specific strategies (Juslin, 
Jones, Olsson, & Winman, 2003) 
 Instruct or train individuals to execute specific 
strategies (Mata, Wilke, & Czienskowski, 2009; 




criterion correlations) favor 
different strategies and 
individuals adapt their strategy 
use accordingly, potentially 
masking developmental effects 
 Design the statistical structure of the task to elicit 
specific strategies (Mata et al., 2007)  
 Compare different statistical structures and assess 
individual or developmental differences in adaptivity 
(Horn, Ruggeri, & Pachur, 2016)  
Strategy execution: 
Differences in judgment or 
choice outcomes may be due to 
differences in both strategy 
selection and strategy execution 
 Adopt computational models that estimate strategy 
execution errors (Mata et al., 2010; Mata, von 
Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2011) 
 Estimate developmental effects on strategy selection 
and execution directly using choice vs. no-choice 
method, that is, comparing experimental conditions 
in which individuals can select (choice) or simply 
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execute (no-choice) particular strategies (Siegler & 




Reinforcement Learning Models 
 
In the previous two paragraphs, we primarily focused on decisions from description, that is, 
tasks in which all the information that is necessary for making the decision is available (e.g., 
information about the value and the probability of an outcome, see Figure 1B and 2). In the 
world outside the laboratory such scenarios exist, for example, when making decisions between 
two different medical treatments with known risks and benefits. However, they are relatively 
rare; in most cases, we have to learn the expected value (EV) of choice options from experience 
(Hertwig & Erev, 2009). Moreover, we live in dynamically changing environments, which 
means that we have to constantly adjust our expectations. To do so, we often rely on trial and 
error learning processes, which undergo substantial developmental changes over the life course. 
In recent years, several research groups became interested in these processes and applied a 
range of experimental tasks (e.g., IGT, multi-armed bandit or reversal-learning tasks) to study 
different aspects of experiential learning. In most of these studies, researchers relied on 
descriptive summary statistics in their analyses (e.g., percentage of correct choices; (Cauffman 
et al., 2010; Denburg, Tranel, & Bechara, 2005; Eppinger, Kray, Mock, & Mecklinger, 2008; 
Eppinger et al., 2009; Hämmerer, Li, Müller, & Lindenberger, 2011; Hooper, Luciana, Conklin, 
& Yarger, 2004). However, the use of these performance measures may result in imprecise or 
even misleading interpretations of the underlying computational and neural mechanisms. For 
example, children and older adults often show similar limitations in learning under uncertainty. 
However, the computational mechanisms that lead to these learning impairments may differ 
substantially between groups (Hämmerer & Eppinger, 2012), which may not be evident from 
descriptive analyses alone. To study learning under uncertainty researchers often use 
probabilistic choice tasks in which participants have to learn the EV of different options based 
on probabilistic reward (e.g., reward in 80% versus 60% of the cases). In such tasks, similar 
performance levels in children and older adults may either emerge from estimating the EV of 
the choice option too rapidly, that is, by ignoring the recent outcome history or by learning too 
slowly, i.e., by considering too much of the outcome history (Nassar, Wilson, Heasly, & Gold, 
2010). From a psychological point of view, learning too rapidly can be described as a tendency 
to change expectations about choice options too quickly. In the above described choice task 
example, this means that a participant is heavily influenced by each outcome and too eager to 
shift to a different choice option when the outcome does not match the expectation. In contrast, 
learning too slowly means that outcomes of decisions are not sufficiently considered. Thus, the 
learner tends to ignore the feedback. Alternatively, similar performance levels in children and 
older adults could be due to opposing exploration strategies. For example, consider yourself 
grocery shopping in a super market in a new (unknown) country. You will have to decide 
between various different types of e.g. cereals. Without any prior knowledge, the best thing that 
you can do is to sample (explore) the different options that you have. However, exploring too 
much results in choosing too many low-reward options, whereas exploring too little can lead to 
missing out on preferable options (Wilson, Geana, White, Ludvig, & Cohen, 2014). What these 
examples mean to illustrate is that being able to assess these different updating and exploration 
strategies may allow us to better understand and disambiguate lifespan age differences in 
learning and decision-making. 
 As outlined in (Hämmerer & Eppinger, 2012) it may also be that different underlying 
neurobiological mechanisms contribute to the seemingly similar performance profiles in 
children and older adults. As such, the observation that different age groups show the same 
performance impairments may not be sufficient to conclude that these are due to changes in 
similar neurobiological processes. As we argued above, computational models may help 
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researchers to develop and test more specific theories about the mechanisms underlying 
developmental differences in learning and decision making and to identify the cognitive and 
neurobiological processes from which these differences emerge. In the following, we describe 
a basic computational implementation of reinforcement learning (RL), the so-called Rescorla-
Wagner model and how it can be applied to study learning processes across development and 
aging (Daw, 2011, 2014; Niv & Schoenbaum, 2008; Sutton & Barto, 1998). RL theory offers 
formal models for learning from interaction with the environment when an individual has no 
direct instructions as to what actions to take. Accordingly, previous experiences of reward are 
used to form expectations about outcomes of future choices. 
The Rescorla-Wagner model (and its many derivatives) relies on a simple principle of 
updating expectations based on prediction errors (Daw, 2011; Sutton & Barto, 1998). This 
model is often applied in simple tasks as in the example above (Figure 3A), where participants 
are required to repeatedly choose one of two options (e.g., blue (B) versus red (R)) that provide 
probabilistic feedback, with the goal of maximizing rewards.  
 We assume that participants start the with a certain expectation about the two options 
(e.g., the EV is 0 for both B and R (Figure 3B)) and subsequently use trial and error information 
to approximate the EV of each option. The basic idea of the Rescorla-Wagner model is that 
value expectations are sequentially updated based on the difference between the EV and the 
received reward: the prediction error ߜ   
 
 (3)    ߜ௧ = ݎ௧ −ܳ௧(ܿ௧) 
 
where ݎ௧  is the received reward at time t and ܳ௧(ܿ௧) is the EV of choice ܿ௧ (B or R) at time ݐ 
(see Figure 3B). This prediction error will subsequently be used to update the EV associated 
with choosing option B or R  
 
(4)    ܳ௧ାଵ(ܿ௧) = ܳ௧(ܿ௧) + ߙ	 ∙ 	 ߜ௧. 
 
Thus, in this algorithm, the EV is updated in the direction of the prediction error to improve the 
accuracy of expectations. The prediction error is multiplied by a learning rate ߙ to scale the 
influence of the prediction error on the updated stimulus value. A high learning rate (~ 1) will 
lead to an update in favor of the most recent outcomes whereas with a low learning rate (~ 0) 
the stimulus value is less affected by the outcome. Thus, the learning rate parameter specifies 
to what extent new outcomes affect reward expectations and can dissociate participants who 
learn rapidly from participants who learn slowly (see example above). In addition, in most of 
the learning scenarios you have two or more options that you can choose between (as in the 
example above). Thus, in order to make a decision you have to compare the value of the options 
and translate these values into choice probabilities. In many RL applications, this is achieved 
with the softmax function as described above (eq. 2). This parameter is often called exploration 
term and thus determines the degree to which the choice options are explored (see grocery 





Figure 3. Reinforcement learning (RL) and model-based fMRI analyses. A) Example of a two-armed bandit task. 
Participants are required to choose between the blue and red option, which is followed by a reward or a punishment. 
B) Reward distribution of the blue and the red option and application of an RL model. On average, the blue option 
is associated with reward, the red option is associated with punishment. Choices indicate that the model is able to 
learn that the blue option is associated with higher reward. As a consequence of a preference for the blue option, the 
model receives rewards on most trials. Across trials, the model approximately learns the expected value (EV) of 
both options. The prediction error (PE) indicates the difference between received rewards and EVs and can be 
utilized to adjust EVs. Finally, model-parameters can be used as parametric regressors in neuroimaging analyses. 
Note that the predicted BOLD signal of rewards and PEs can go in opposite directions.  
 
To illustrate how RL models can be used to dissociate behavioral performance 
profiles in different groups we can simulate behavior of a fast and a slow learner (a learner 
with a high or low learning rate): Figure 4 shows behavior of the two RL models (Figure 
4A,B) and the average performance (Figure 4C) across simulations in the above descried two-
armed bandits task. The comparison is based on 500 simulations each consisting of 30 trials. 
Both models haven an exploration parameter ߠ = 5. However, behavior of model 1 (Figure 












































4A) was generated using a high learning rate (ߙ = 0.6) with the effect that the EV of model 1 
fluctuates wildly. Model 2 (Figure 4B), in contrast, uses a low learning rate (ߙ = 0.05), which 
consequently leads to a slow change in the EV. As can be nicely seen, although the 
underlying parameters are clearly different, the average performance of both models is 
similar.  
This simple example demonstrates both promises and pitfalls of computational 
modeling. It suggests that observed behavioral effects can potentially be generated by 
different combinations of parameters that may be captured using computational models. 
However, it also demonstrates the need for careful experimental design: To reliably identify 
parameter differences between groups or individuals, one needs to carefully think about 
experimental task conditions that allow to dissociate these parameters (see also Box 3).  
 
 
Figure 4. Simulations using a reinforcement learning (RL) model with different learning rate but equal exploration 
parameters. A) Rapidly learning RL model with a learning rate ߙ = 0.6 and exploration term ߠ = 5. B) Slowly 
learning model with a learning rate ߙ = 0.05. C) Although models have different learning rate parameters, mean 
performance across 500 simulations with 30 trials each is similar. Error bars represent the standard deviation of the 
mean between the simulations.  
 
Taken together, one of the advantages of computational RL approaches for developmental 
science is that they allow us to get access to latent variables (such as learning rates or 
exploration parameters) that cannot be accessed with descriptive approaches alone. These 
variables may help us to disambiguate behavioral profiles of different age groups and may 
provide us with a better mechanistic understanding of developmental differences.  
 
Implications for imaging 
Beyond global parameters such as learning rate or exploration parameter, which are estimated 
on the individual subject level, RL models can also be used to derive trial-by-trial estimates of 
two other latent variables: the reward prediction error ߜ௧ 	and the EV ܳ௧ାଵ	of the choice options 
(actions). When performance differences in learning occur between two different age groups, 
an obvious question of computational interest is whether these differences are associated with 
changes in in reward prediction error signaling or the representation of EV in different cortical 
or subcortical areas. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to construct an fMRI design 
matrix that models the task events (e.g., decision, outcome) and includes a term that reflects the 
extent to which an event response is modulated by the parametric variable (the prediction error 













































software and the resulting coefficients for these modulator terms provide a quantitative measure 
of the relationship between the BOLD signal and the latent variable of interest (e.g., reward 
prediction error). Thus, in principle this measure can be used to test for differences in neural 
computations underlying learning (Figure 3B).  
 
Several recent studies have taken advantage of these approaches and show evidence 
for differences in the correlation between model-derived prediction errors and BOLD activity 
in the ventral striatum in children and adolescents (Christakou et al., 2013; Hauser, Iannaccone, 
Walitza, Brandeis, & Brem, 2014; Javadi, Schmidt, & Michael, 2014; van den Bos et al., 2012) 
as well as older adults (Chowdhury et al., 2013; Eppinger, Schuck, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2013; 
Samanez-Larkin, Worthy, Mata, McClure, & Knutson, 2014). Most of this work has focused 
on model-free RL, using for example the Rescorla-Wagner model described above. Recently, 
however, there is an increasing interest in more complex types of RL (“model-based” learning), 
which involve learning of a forward model of the environment that can be used for planning 
(Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Dolan & Dayan, 2013). Model-based learning may be 
advantageous, especially in complex environments, because it allows more sophisticated 
behavioral strategies than model-free learning. However, this advantage comes at the cost of 
higher demands on, for example, working memory and attention, which makes it an interesting 
target for research in lifespan cognitive neuroscience (Decker, Otto, Daw, & Hartley, 2016; 
Eppinger, Walter, Heekeren, & Li, 2013).  
In a recent age-comparative study, Nassar and colleagues (Nassar et al., 2016) used RL 
principles in combination with Bayesian methods to model learning dynamics in uncertain and 
changing environments. Using a predictive inference task, the authors examined age-related 
changes in the factors that affect trial-to-trial adjustments of learning rates. The results 
suggested that age-related learning deficits in older adults are due to a specific deficit in 
representing uncertainty. This deficit may not directly affect prediction error signaling but 
rather the computation of the learning rate, which, as described above, determines the degree 
to which prediction errors are considered during learning. 
To conclude, RL offers a theoretical framework to study learning and decision making 
across the lifespan. The key advantage of these computational models is that they allow us to 
estimate latent variables such as prediction errors or the learning rate that cannot be assessed 
using descriptive models. Another important advantage is that RL models can be used to 
simulate the impact of developmental differences on behavior (see (Nassar et al., 2016; 
Palminteri, Wyart, & Koechlin, 2016)). This leads to a considerable increase in the specificity 
of predictions regarding developmental differences in learning and decision processes. Finally, 
model parameters can be used to inform fMRI or EEG analyses which may allow to identify 
the neurobiological mechanisms underlying developmental changes in learning. However, 
despite all these potential advantages, in practice, there are also many technical hurdles that 





Box 3: Computational Modeling of Lifespan Differences 
 
As outlined above there are several advantages of the application of computational models in 
developmental cognitive neuroscience studies. However, in practice, there are also many 
technical hurdles that can impede these lofty research goals. In the following section, we will 
focus on a few of these issues that are particularly relevant for developmental comparisons.  
 
Model comparison 
Identifying a suitable model of behavior generally requires comparing the fit of several 
candidate models. For example, several researchers compared RL models with a single learning 
rate and models with a separate learning rate for positive and negative outcomes (van den Bos 
et al., 2012). Intuitively, model comparison generally involves some assessment of how likely 
candidate models would be to generate the observed behavior; however, another important 
consideration is model complexity. Models that have more freedom to explain nuances in 
behavior (and nuances in measurement noise) should be penalized for any performance gains 
achieved through overfitting (capturing variability in the noise). This is often done using 
penalized likelihood-based metrics such as the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC), which penalize complexity based on parameter number 
and can be appropriate under a circumscribed set of assumptions. A more robust approach is to 
compute out-of-sample likelihoods through k-fold cross-validation or leave-one-out procedures 
(Friedman, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2001). Out-of-sample techniques are robust to non-
independence of data across trials and subjects, making them ideally suited for model 
comparison in hierarchical models where dependencies between subjects are modeled directly 
(Vehtari, Gelman, & Gabry, 2016).  In general, out-of-sample methods are justified under a 
wider range of conditions and can capture more nuanced forms of complexity. In either case, 
best practice is to always validate the model using posterior-predictive checking to verify that 
the “best fitting” model is likely to generate behavioral data that look like those produced by 
human subjects (see below).  
Note also that model comparison is another way of explicitly testing different theories 
against each other given the data, which is, as we argued before (van den Bos & Eppinger, 
2016) very hard to do with descriptive models. As pointed out in Table 1 (identification) 
simulations can also be used a priori to check in advance whether an experimental setting is 
even capable of distinguishing between selected models (Mata et al., 2007; Mata, von 
Helversen, et al., 2012; von Helversen et al., 2010).  
 
Posterior-predictive checking 
One of the first steps in computational analyses is to find out whether the model that we have 
used fits the patterns of behavior shown by the participants. Just looking at the parameter values 
or goodness of fit will not reveal this; an insufficient model can provide highly misleading 
parameterizations of behavior (Nassar & Gold, 2013; Palminteri et al., 2016). During posterior-
predictive checking (Box, 1980; Gelman, Meng, & Stern, 1996), we use the best fitting 
computational models to simulate data. These simulated data are then submitted to the same 
descriptive analyses that have been used to analyze the acquired (participant) data (Nassar & 
Frank, 2016). In some cases, this procedure might reveal that the effects observed in the 
simulated data closely resemble those observed in subject’s data. In other cases, the comparison 
may reveal a shortcoming of the model that suggests that the model architecture needs to be 
changed in order capture the data.  
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Group differences in model fit 
A relevant concern for lifespan research is the possibility that two groups of subjects (e.g., 
younger and older adults) might be best described by different computational models. First, this 
may reflect true group differences in strategy use (which may be the result you were expecting). 
In this case, it will not be very meaningful to select a single model, for instance the one that fits 
the combined data of the groups the best, and pretend that it is the generative model for all 
participants. However, in some cases it could be that there exists a meaningful hybrid model 
that includes the features necessary to describe each group, mixed with a single parameter that 
governs the relative contributions of each model (Daw, Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 
2011; Nassar et al., 2010). For example, recent age-comparative studies using such hybrid 
models showed evidence for qualitative changes in model-free and model-based learning 
mechanisms across the human lifespan (Decker et al., 2016; Eppinger, Walter, et al., 2013). 
 
Individual versus group based parameter estimation 
After model selection, the free parameters of the model of interest (such as the learning rate 
and exploration term) are generally estimated in order obtain trial-wise latent variables (e.g., 
prediction error) and to identify parameter differences between groups. On one extreme, models 
could be fit individually to each subject, and trial-wise latent variables could be extracted 
according to the model that best fits that particular subject. On the other extreme, the model 
could be run across data for all subjects using a set of “average” parameters, such that trial-
wise latent variables are computed in the same way for each subject. Each of these approaches 
has its shortcomings; fitting to individual subjects leads to imprecision from limited trial data, 
whereas group average parameters may not provide a particularly good characterization of any 
particular subject and thus result in the selection of the wrong generative model (Wulff & van 
den Bos, 2017). A compromise between these methods is to use a hierarchical approach, such 
that estimates for individual subjects are constrained by their own data, as well as a group level 
prior that incorporates data from other subjects. In this way, parameter estimates for all subjects, 
but particularly those for subjects with limited or highly variable behavioral measurements, will 
be pulled toward the mean parameter estimate across the entire group “shrinking” the range of 
parameter estimates. In principle, this can be repeated at multiple levels of analysis, for 
example, in a nested model that includes a global prior distribution from which parameters for 
individual age groups are sampled. Individual parameters are then sampled from the lowest 
level such that they are pulled toward the mean of their own parameter distribution as well as 
the global mean. Note that the hierarchical approach does require making explicit modeling 
decisions about the prior distribution and form of hierarchy, and thus care should be taken to 
ensure that results are not overly conditioned on these choices (Gelman et al., 2014). That said, 
non-hierarchical models also make implicit assumptions about prior distributions (improper 
uniform) and relationships between subjects (either zero or full pooling) that could affect 
results.  
 
Linking latent computational variables to indirect neural measurements 
Once parameters are estimated, trial-wise parameters can be extracted from the properly 
parameterized model and linked to indirect measures of neural function such as fMRI or EEG 
data. This can be done by including trial-wise latent variables from the computational model as 
an explanatory variable in a GLM to explain trial-wise physiological measurements. One 
important consideration in this process is how to normalize trial-wise variables; if using either 
individual subject or hierarchical fitting approaches, it is important to normalize the variance 
(z-score) of the trial-wise latent variables for each individual subject, to ensure that detected 
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differences in regression coefficients are not simply picking up on differences in scale emerging 
from the fitting process. 
 
Parameter recovery 
In order to interpret in differences in the best fitting parameters across groups, it is important 
to show that the model fitting procedures employed are capable of identifying meaningful and 
stable differences in any of the parameters. For instance, when there are interactions between 
parameters, it is possible that there are many different parameter settings that generate the same 
pattern of behavior. Simulating data from models that take a range of different combinations of 
parameter values and attempting to recover those “true” parameters by fitting the model directly 
to the data it generated will be informative. Only if these analyses reveal that the simulated and 
recovered parameter values are related in a systematic and continuous fashion they can be used 
for meaningful age comparisons. 
 
Linking computational changes to differences in behavior across developmental groups 
Once a computational model has been identified, a key question is whether the constructs 
captured by its free parameters (e.g. learning rate) differ systematically across groups. When 
data of individual subjects are fit separately (e.g., by choosing the model parameters that 
maximize the likelihood of the individual data), this can simply be done by comparing the group 
median parameter fits (e.g., using a Wilcoxon signed rank test). When interpreting a parameter 
difference, it is often useful to know whether behavioral differences are selective to a single 
computational factor (e.g., learning rate for gains but not for losses). To do so, it is important 
to remember that the existence of a statistical difference in one parameter and the lack of a 
difference in another parameter does not necessarily imply selectivity; claims of specificity 
should rely on explicit comparisons of age differences across the different parameters 
(Nieuwenhuis, Forstmann, & Wagenmakers, 2011). In a hierarchical model, parameter 
differences between groups can be estimated by examining the posterior distribution over group 




General Discussion  
 
In this paper, we have provided an overview about how computational models of cognition can 
be used to study age-related changes in psychological processes and the underlying 
neurobiological mechanisms across the human lifespan. The core idea of this neuro-
computational approach is that formalized models can provide us with mechanistic links 
between verbal descriptions of behavior and its cognitive and neurobiological implementations.  
Specifically, we propose that computational models allow us to address two current 
problems in developmental cognitive neuroscience: 1) The problem of making predictions 
about behavior and the underlying neurobiology that are specific enough to falsify verbal 
theories (specificity problem) and 2) The problem of capturing the identity of developmental 
processes (identity problem). We have shown applications of computational neuroscience 
approaches in two major domains of decision making: decisions from description and decisions 
from experience. Here we have focused on the use of models to describe that behavior, note 
that there is already a wealth of developmental neuroscience studies on these topics (Hartley & 
Somerville, 2015). 
 In both of these domains computational approaches in combination with neuroimaging 
can significantly advance our mechanistic understanding of the underlying processes. This has 
led to the development of new fields such as computational psychiatry which aims to provide 
a mechanistic understanding of psychiatric disorders that can guide theory-based clinical 
interventions (Ahn & Busemeyer, 2016; Huys, Maia, & Frank, 2016). Many of the disorders 
under study (such as schizophrenia, anxiety, addiction or ADHD) develop during late childhood 
and adolescence. Therefore, any type of complete theory utilized to explain these disorders has 
to incorporate a normative perspective of human development. The same is true for aging-
related diseases such as Parkinson’s disease or dementia. Yet, we are far away from such neuro-
computational theories of development and aging. The aim of this work is to provide a starting 
point for the development of such theories and to encourage researchers to adopt neuro-
computational approaches. 
It is obvious that there are important questions and research strategies that we have not 
covered. For example, there is an emerging literature on developmental differences in 
perceptual decision making and the use of drift diffusion models to discern different perceptual 
decision making processes (Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2006; Schuch & Konrad, 2017; 
Spaniol, Madden, & Voss, 2006; Thompson, Ratcliff, & McKoon, 2016). Furthermore, there is 
an increasing interest in studying how the effort that is involved in making a decision affects 
choice behavior. So far there are only a few studies on age differences in effortful decision 
making (Benozio & Diesendruck, 2015; Westbrook, Kester, & Braver, 2013) and the existing 
computational approaches (Kool, Cushman, & Gershman, 2016; Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 
2013) have not (yet) been implemented. We have not addressed a core dilemma in decision 
making, the question how we solve the trade-off between exploration and exploitation and how 
this changes across development (Somerville et al., 2017; Wilson et al., 2014). Finally, we also 
ignored the extensive literature on neural network modeling of development (Mareschal & 
Shultz, 1996; Plunkett, Karmiloff-Smith, Bates, & Johnson, 1997). These models provide 
(even) more complex perspectives on cognitive development and aging and may be well suited 
to address the identity problem. 
With respect to the neuroscience approaches we focused on fMRI, but there are new 
ways of analyzing EEG data using single trial approaches which are promising (Fischer & 
Ullsperger, 2013) and there are several other recent examples of extremely fruitful 
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combinations of computational modeling and psychophysiological measures (Cavanagh, 
Wiecki, Kochar, & Frank, 2014; Nassar et al., 2012).  
As outlined there are several potential pitfalls when applying computational models to 
behavioral data and in using the outcomes of modeling to inform neuroscience data. Some of 
these pitfalls are specific to developmental research questions, others are more general and our 
review of these issues is certainly not exhaustive (for more detailed descriptions please refer to 
(Daw, 2011; Nassar & Frank, 2016; Palminteri et al., 2016) and to (Redish & Gordon, 2016) 
for an overview of uses in psychiatry). Given the increasing interest in computational 
neuroscience methods it is important to note that there are several non-trivial inferential 
problems regarding 1) whether and to which degree a model actually fits the data and 2) what 
correlations between computational parameters and neurobiological signals actually reflect. 
The latter point refers to the fact that with the current neuroimaging approaches we cannot make 
causal inferences about model parameters and neurobiological signals. That is, even though it 
may be tempting to assume that, for example, learning deficits in older adults are due to 
diminished striatal prediction error signals, the relationship still remains a correlative one and 
typically activity in several other areas also correlates with prediction errors (Hayden, 
Heilbronner, Pearson, & Platt, 2011; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000). To tackle the question of 
causality, we will have to rely on non-invasive brain stimulation methods (e.g., rTMS) or 
pharmacological manipulations (Chowdhury et al., 2013), and engage in cross-species 
comparisons (e.g., involving optogenetic manipulations in rodents). In addition, the correlation 
(or lack thereof) between computational parameters and neuroscience data can also be used in 
model selection itself. Often the computational model is fit on the behavioral data alone, but to 
the extent that the model makes predictions about neural processes, model selection can also 
be (simultaneously) constrained by neural data. This is an exciting future direction in 
computational neuroscience that can further our confidence in the identification of cognitive 
processes underlying life span changes in behavior (Turner et al. 2013).  
We are aware of the valid concern that computational neuroscience approaches may 
lead to a segmentation of behavior into “molecular” psychological and neurobiological 
processes that are, at some point, far removed from the behavior that was originally set out to 
be explained. That is, the jargon associated with increasingly complex computational models 
may become meaningless if the models cannot speak to existing psychological theories of 
behavior. It is therefore crucial to use our increasing understanding of the neuro-computational 
mechanisms to answer the question of why humans of different ages behave in a certain way, 
by finding ways of linking the algorithmic level to back the level of verbal theories.  
Finally, it is important to point out that computational modeling cannot replace good 
experimental design, but rather can inform it. That is, the value of a computational model is 
constrained by the value of the experimental design that it is associated with. Even if the model 
could perfectly explain the behavior on a specific task, and the accompanying neural processes, 
it will be of limited value if this task has no external validity. For instance, adolescents probably 
only rarely encounter “risky” choices where they are presented with full information about 
probabilities and outcomes such as is often done in monetary gambles (see Figure 1B). Thus, 
one may wonder how informative age differences in parameters of pure risky choice models 
will be (cf. (van den Bos & Hertwig, 2017)). In addition, experimental tasks are often simplified 
in order to capture one specific feature of the real-world environment or one isolated 
psychological process. This strategy may limit external validity because it may miss out on 
crucial complexities that explain real world behavior. Having a good computational model will 
provide a framework for understanding how multiple variables interact (and change over time) 
and therefore may allow for the design of more complex, externally valid experiments. 
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To conclude, we think that neuro-computational approaches have a tremendous 
potential for studying human development across the lifespan. Computational methods can 
provide access to latent processes that are not accessible with descriptive methods and may thus 
foster the development of mechanistic theories of normative development. This allows specific 
predictions about brain behavior relationships in different developmental groups (specificity 
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